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Decentralization, Democracy and Allocation of Poverty Alleviation 
Programs in Rural India   
 
I.  Introduction 
Whether decentralization actually improves the living conditions of the poor, women, or 
the minority groups in India is still one of the key research questions in the area of 
political economy and has been widely discussed among academics and policy makers. 
Among many paths through which decentralization affects poverty directly or indirectly, 
the present study highlights one of the important routes- its effects on allocation of 
poverty  alleviation  programmes.  That  is,  we  evaluate  how  decentralization  or 
democratization would affect the allocation of poverty alleviation programmes, namely, 
IRDP  (Integrated  Rural  Development  Programmes)  and  RPW  (Rural  Public  Works) 
drawing upon National Sample Survey (NSS) data in 1993-1994 and 1999-2000. Here 
the NSS data are supplemented by the regionally aggregated election  data from the 
Election Commission of India. The reason that we focus on these two rounds is that we 
are  able  to  compare  Madhya  Pradesh  which  clearly  implemented  decentralization 
between 1993-4 and 1999-2000, with the states which had already been decentralized 
well before 1993, namely, Karnataka, Kerala, and West Bengal. This would give us an 
ideal situation where we evaluate the effects of decentralization on allocation of poverty 
alleviation  programmes  by  taking  a  ‘natural  experiment’  approach  based  on  the 3 
 
difference-in-difference method. We also evaluate the effects of political democracy or 
political competition on allocation of poverty alleviation programmes.   
    An  important  progress  was  made  on  decentralization  in  India  by  the  73rd 
Constitutional Amendment of 1993 which stipulated that regular compulsory elections 
for local self-governments, i.e, 'Panchayats,' be held. In addition, it devolved powers to 
Panchayats for the planning and implementation of the poverty alleviation programs in 
such  a  way  that  the  elected  Panchayats  can  determine  the  beneficiary  selection  for 
poverty  alleviation  programs,  such  as  the  Integrated  Rural  Development  Program 
(IRDP)  and  Jawhar  Rozgar  Yojana  (JRY,  the  former  National  Rural  Employment 
Program (NREP)). A number of states, including Madhya Pradesh, were decentralised 
after 1993.     
     It is noted that decentralization should have some advantages over centralization. 
First, the actions of the elected representatives are effectively monitored and disciplined 
by  the  pressure  of  election  competition.  Therefore,  decentralization  is  supposed  to 
improve the accountability of the governance. Second, the local government can more 
easily collect and use the information flows from the grassroots than the upper level 
government.  This  information  advantage  supports,  in  principle,  a  more  appropriate 
allocation of publicly provided goods within the local area (Seabright, 1996).   4 
 
     However,  it  can  be  argued  that  due  to  decentralization,  the  local  elite  may 
dominate the democratic institutions and monopolize the resource allocation by using 
their political influence. The most disadvantaged groups may be excluded from rural 
politics, as they will seldom be able to compete against the local elite, especially within 
a small village. Thus, in the local areas, there is likely to be little or even an adverse 
impact on the well being of the poor when there is a large amount of inequality and the 
governance  structure  for  accountability  is  weak  (Bardhan,  2002;  2003).
1  Generally 
speaking, the success of decentralization in distributing poverty alleviation programmes 
widely and alleviating poverty depends on whether the disadvantaged groups are able to 
increase their voice in local politics and whether the democratic process can enhance the 
accountability of the Panchayat. The main objective of this study is thus to test whether 
decentralization has a positive or negative impact on allocation of poverty alleviation 
programmes. We particularly focus on households which were the beneficiaries of the 
poverty alleviation programs before and after decentralization.   
   There is a growing body of literature that investigated the effects of political 
democratization, including decentralization, on the allocation of public goods in India 
(e.g. Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006, 2007, Betancourt and Gleason, 2000, Besley and 
Burgess, 2002, Besley, Pande, and Rao, 2005, Besley, Pande, Rahman, and Rao, 2004, 5 
 
Burgess, Pande and Wong, 2005, Chattopadhay and Duflo, 2004a, 2004b, Chhibber and 
Nooruddin, 2004, Chhibber, Shastri, and Sisson, 2004, Foster and Rosenzweig, 2004, 
Gaiha,  2003,  Greason,  2001,  Pande,  2003).  For  example,  Bardhan  and  Mookherjee 
(2006) assessed the determinants of the allocation of the poverty alleviation programs 
drawing upon the panel data set at the village level spanning from the 1970s to the 
1990s. They found that intra-village allocations are targeted in favour of the poor and 
there are the mild adverse effects of land inequality, low caste status, and illiteracy 
among the poor. In contrast, inter-village allocations show a stronger and significant 
bias  against  the  poor.  While  not  distinguishing  between  inter  and  intra  village 
allocations, the present study explicitly assesses the effects of decentralization on the 
allocation of poverty alleviation programmes in India.   
     Besley, Pande, Rahman, and Rao (2004) used the household data from a survey 
that they conducted in 2002 in three southern states, namely, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, 
and Tamil Nadu in order to understand the politics of the provision of public goods. 
They found that on one hand, for high spill-over public goods such as roads, drains, 
streetlights, and water sources, the residence of the elected politician was relevant; on 
the other, for low spill-over public goods such as public schemes for the construction of 
houses and toilets, and the provision of private water and electricity connections, the 6 
 
politician's group identity was relevant. Besley, Pande, and Rao (2005) investigated who 
participated in the Gram Sabha and the extent to which the Gram Sabha had an effect on 
beneficiary selection for government programs in the southern Indian states. They found 
that the more disadvantaged social groups such as the illiterate, landless, and SCs/STs 
participate in the Gram Sabha and the establishment of the Gram Sabha has a positive 
effect in terms of the greater allocation of resources to the neediest. Our econometric 
results,  however,  show  the  results  in  contrast  with  Besley,  Pande,  and  Rao  (2005) 
-decentralization  had  an  adverse  effect  in  the  allocation  of  poverty  alleviation 
programmes. While the growing body of the literature generally points to the positive 
effect  of  decentralization  on  welfare  of  the  disadvantaged  group  (e.g.  the  poor,  the 
landless, Scheduled Castes, women) through more equitable public goods allocation, 
there  has  been  few  works  to  explicitly  evaluate  the  effects  of  decentralization  on 
allocation of poverty alleviation programmes. The present study attempts to fill the gap.         
     The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section  provides  the 
institutional background of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment and the salient features 
of poverty alleviation programs. The data are briefly explained and discussed in Section 
III.  Section  IV  provides  the  econometric  and  results  to  empirically  investigate  the 
allocation of the poverty alleviation programs  before and after decentralization. The 7 
 
final section offers some concluding observations.           
 
II.  Institutional Context 
This  section  describes  the  features  of  the  73rd  Constitutional  Amendment  of  1993 
which  aimed  at  decentralization,  and  then  summarizes  the  nature  of  the  poverty 
alleviation programs in rural areas. 
 
II.1. The 73rd Constitutional Amendment 
The 73rd Amendment provided constitutional  status  to  the three-tier 'Panchyati Raj' 
(local self-governance) system. ‘Panchayat’ is an institution of local self-government in 
rural areas. This three-tier system consists of the ‘Zilla Parishad’ at the district level, the 
‘Panchayat Samiti’ at the block level, and the ‘Gram Panchayat’ at the village level. 
Persons selected by direct election fill all the seats in a Panchayat.  In addition, the 
‘Gram  Sabha’  is  a  village  assembly  consisting  of  persons  registered  in  the  Gram 
Panchayat election. The relationship between the Gram Sabha and the Gram Panchayat 
can be considered to be the same as that between the parliament and the government. 
The roll of Gram Sabha is to monitor and regulate the behavior of the Gram Panchayat.           
As per the 73rd Amendment, Panchayat elections are held regularly every five years. In 
many states, the Gram Sabha meetings are required to be held four times a year. 8 
 
     To  implement  the  Amendment,  with  the  exception  of  Jammu  and  Kashmir, 
National Capital Territory (NCT) Delhi, and Arunachal Pradesh, all the other states and 
union territories (UTs) passed their corresponding Panchayat acts. Almost all the states 
and UTs, except for Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, NCT Delhi, and Pondicherry 
have held Panchayat elections.   
     As per the 73rd Amendment, seats for the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled 
Tribes (STs) in Panchayats were reserved to reflect the population share of SCs and STs. 
Not less than one-third of the total number of seats were reserved for the SCs/STs and 
not less than one-third of all seats were reserved for women. Moreover, the position of 
chairpersons in the Panchayat was also reserved for SCs, STs, and women in the same 
manner that seats were reserved for them. The reservation of the chairperson for women 
was allotted by randomized rotation to different constituencies in a Panchayat.   
     The scope of a Panchayat’s responsibilities for preparing and implementing plans 
for economic development and social justice is listed in the Eleventh Schedule of the 
Constitution. Indeed, one of the roles of a Panchayat is to plan and implement poverty 
alleviation programs; this clause is listed as number 16 in the Eleventh Schedule. 
     Finally, we refer to the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Area) Act that 
went into effect in 1996. This act extends to the tribal areas of nine states, which had not 9 
 
been covered under the decentralization of 1993. In 1996, all the state governments 
enacted the registrations corresponding to the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled 
Area) Act. Therefore, the provisions of the 73rd Amendment are applicable to all the 
Indian people after 1996. 
 
II.2. Poverty Alleviation Programs 
The IRDP, under which the Small Farmers Development Agencies Programme (SFDA), 
the Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP), and the other similar self-employment 
programs were merged, was launched universally from October 1980. The IRDP had 
been one of the major poverty alleviation programmes in India till it was merged with 
another Scheme named Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) in April 1999. 
The IRDP aimed at generating sufficient income to enable the rural poor to cross the 
poverty  line.  The  IRDP  provided  government  subsidy  and  bank  credit  to  the  poor 
identified as below the poverty line (BPL) families in order to encourage the application 
of  new  agricultural  technologies  such  as  pump  sets  and  to  diversify  the  agriculture 
economy through subsidiary activities such as animal husbandry.   
     Roughly speaking, the IRDP assisted about 3.4 million families per year in the 
1980s and 2.5 million families per year in the 1990s
2. According to the National Sample 10 
 
Survey (NSS), the percentage of rural households receiving IRDP assistance was 6.3 
percent in the period 1987-88, 6.3 percent in the period 1993-94, and 5.2 percent in the 
period 1999-2000
3. 
     With regard to the Training of Rural Youth for Self Employment Programme 
(TRYSEM) as a subsidiary program of the IRDP, in the late 1990s, about 60 percent of 
the beneficiaries were made aware of the TRYSEM by their respective Panchayats or 
relatives. On one hand, around half of the beneficiaries were selected by block officials, 
based on the list of BPL families; on the other, one-fourth were selected directly by the 
Panchayat
4.   
     According to the Ministry of Rural Development, the role of the Panchayat in the 
implementation of the IRDP could be described as follows. First, the Gram Sabha 
approves the list of BPL families. Second, the list of activities and names of villages 
identified under the IRDP in the block should be approved by the  Panchayat Samiti. 
Third, the list of beneficiaries finally selected should be made available to the Gram 
Panchayat for placing it before the next Gram Sabha. Fourth, the Gram Panchayat 
actively monitors the performance of the beneficiaries. Fifth, the Zilla Parishad reviews 
in its meetings the performance under the IRDP
5. 
     The assets under the IRDP consist of milk animals, drought animals, sheep/goats, 11 
 
pump-sets, fish-ponds, sewing machines, other agricultural tools and equipment, and 
others, which include all forms of assistance not specified. According to the NSS, in the 
period 1999-2000 the share of assets in the form of total milk animals was 71 percent; 
drought animals, 2 percent; and sheep/goats, 4 percent; in the period 1993-1994, the 
share of assets in the form of total milk animals, drought animals, and sheep/goats was 
40 percent, 11 percent, and 8 percent, respectively
6. 
     Rural Public Works (RPW) defined in the NSS consists of the NREP, Rural 
Landless Employment Guarantee Programme (RLEGP), Minimum Needs Programme 
(MNP), and  other schemes aiming  at  providing  employment  for  wages  set  at  an 
appropriate level, which are expected to attract only the poor. The NREP was launched 
in October 1980 and the RLEGP was initiated in August 1983. These two  programs 
were the main wage employment programs which were nationally implemented by the 
collaboration of the central government and the state governments. The NREP and 
RLEGP were merged under the JRY in April 1989. Moreover, the JRY was revamped as 
the Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana (JGSY) in April 1999. With regard to other wage 
employment programs, the Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS) was initiated from 
October 1993, to provide employment to the poor in the agriculturally slack season and 
the Food for Work Programme was launched in the period 2000-01 to provide nutrition 12 
 
to the vulnerable groups in the drought-prone states. From September 2001, the JGSY, 
EAS,  and  Food  for  Work  Programme  were  integrated  into  the  Sampoorna  Gramin 
Rozgar Yojana (SGRY).
7 
8   
      Generally  speaking,  RPW  provides  wage  employment  to  the  poor  in 
agriculturally slack seasons and during natural calamities such as floods and droughts. 
They  also  create and  maintain productive  community assets  for supporting  future 
economic activity. They cover the construction of roads, drainage structures, dams and 
bunds, the digging of ponds, maintenance of forestry, building of school, and so on.   
     The JRY and EAS provided annual full employment to about 1 million workers in 
the 1980s and about  2 million workers in 1990s, subject to the assumption that full 
employment for one person per year is regarded as 300 working days
9. According to the 
NSS, the percentage of rural households participating in public works programs was 6.4 
percent in the period 1987-88, 5.9 percent in the period 1993-94, and 2.9 percent in the 
period 1999-2000
10. 
     According to the Concurrent Evaluation Report of the JRY, whose reference 
period is 1993-94, Gram Panchayats spent 83 percent of available funds under the JRY 
and gave the highest priority to the construction of rural link roads. The same report on 
the late 1990s confirms that the executive agency for the implementation of the JRY 13 
 
was primarily the Gram Panchayat. It suggests that at the district, the block, and the 
village  levels,  it  seems  necessary  to  involve  elected  representatives  in  the 
decision-making process while undertaking JRY works.
11  The role of the Panchayats in 
the implementation of the SGRY (JRY) is as follows: The first stream of the program 
will be implemented at the district and block level Panchayats. Half the funds will be 
distributed between the Zilla Panchayat and the Panchayat Samiti in the ratio 40:60. The 
second stream of the program will be implemented at the village level. The remainder of 
the  funds  will  be  released  to  the  Gram  Panchayats  through  the  District  Rural 
Development Agency (DRDA) and Panchayat Samiti.
12 
 
III.  Data and Main Variables   
The  present  study  draws  upon  household  data  constructed  by  two  rounds  of 
consumption module of NSS data, the 50th round in 1993-1994, and the 55th round in 
1999-2000 collected by National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), Government of 
India. NSS covers detailed socioeconomic information on approximately 700,000 rural 
households. In addition, we use the election data sets from the Election Commission of 
India's  Statistical  Report  on  General  Elections,  1991  to  the  Tenth  Lok  Sabha
13  and 
Statistical Report on General Elections, 1999 to the Thirteenth Lok Sabha in order to 
investigate the political influence on be neficiary selection. The former corresponds to 14 
 
the 50th round (1993-1994) NSS data set; the latter to the 55th round (1999-2000) data 
set. These reports contain detailed election data at the constituency level. 
     We combine NSS data and the election data by using the identification of the 
'NSS  region',  which  NSSO  classifies  according  to  the  ecological  and  agricultural 
similarities.
14  That is, we aggregate the constituency election results at the level of NSS 
region by using the district map obtained from  the Census of India website, the 
constituency map on the Election Commission of India website, and the NSS’s code 
manual  which  indicates  the  relationship  between  the  district  and  NSS  region.  The 
number of NSS regions in India is around 70 and that of districts is around 500 and thus 
we cannot capture electoral competition within the NSS region. 
     Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the present 
study. The dependent variable for a probit model to be discussed in the next section is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if someone in a household receives public support, 
i.e., the IRDP in the last five years, or has been beneficiary of public works for more 
than 60 days in the last 365 days, and zero otherwise. The number of observations 
(NOB) varies with different dependent variables due to missing observations. 
     Explanatory variables can be classified according to three categories, namely, (1) 
household characteristics, (2) state fixed effect, and (3) socio political environment at 15 
 
the regional level. First, household characteristics include the illiteracy dummy of head 
of household (illiterate=1, literate=0); sex of head of household (female=1, male=0); 
land  owner  dummy  (landed=1,  landless=0);  Muslim  dummy  (Muslim=1,  non 
Muslim=0); ST dummy (ST=1, non ST=0); SC dummy (SC=1, non SC=0); agricultural 
labour  household  dummy  (agricultural  labor  household=1,  others=0);  agricultural 
self-employment dummy (agricultural self employment=1, others=0); age of head of 
household, and; number of adults in a household (adult is defined as a person aged 15 
years and above).
15   
     Second, the inclusion of state fixed effects is justified on the ground that not only 
the governance structure and political regime but also the actual impleme ntation of 
decentralization differs considerably across different states. As is well known, on one 
hand, Karnataka, Kerala and West Bengal have good local governance structures; on the 
other,  'BIMARU,'  i.e.,  Bihar,  Madhya  Pradesh,  Rajasthan,  and  Uttar  Prad esh,  are 
backward and weak in these aspects on the other hand. Therefore, it can be conjectured 
that there is a state fixed effect on the allocation of the poverty alleviation programs. 
     Third, socio-political environmental variables at the regional le vel are the Gini 
coefficients of per capita owned land
16, the voter turnout rate as proxy of the political 
participation,  and  two -party  competitiveness  index.  The  two -party  competitiveness 16 
 
index is defined by           , which reflects the political competition where enp refers 
to the effective number of parties defined by 
 
    
   
  , where n is the number of parties, and 
pi is the i
th party's vote share. If one party holds a larger share or there are many parties 
with equal shares, it shows a larger value, while more competitive political situation 
closer to perfect competition with the equal vote share between two parties leads to a 
smaller value (close to 0). The main idea behind the index is that the perfect competition 
between  the  two  political  parties  with  the  equal  vote  shares  represents  the  most 
democratic  political  system.  The  specification  using  this  kind  of  political  indices 
follows  earlier  studies,  such  as  Besley  and  Burgess  (2002),  Besley,  Pande  and  Rao 
(2005), and Chhibber and Nooruddin (2005).     
 
IV.  Econometric Models and Results 
IV.1. Profile of Beneficiaries of the Poverty Alleviation Programs 
To examine who participates in the poverty alleviation programs, we estimate the Probit 
model as follows: 
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where    
   is a latent variable,      is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the ith 
household participates in the poverty alleviation programs,    is the state fixed effect, 
     are  socio-political  variables  at  the  regional  level,       is  the  ith  household 
characteristics, and     is the error term. We estimate probit model for cross-sectional 
data  in  each  year  and  then  investigate  the  coefficient  estimates  to  identify  the 
determinants of household participation in IRDP or RPW.   
     The results of probit model are reported in Table 2. The first two columns show 
the cases for IRDP in 1993 and 1999, while the second and the third columns are for 
RPW in 1993 and 1999. The last two columns are for the aggregate cases of poverty 
alleviation  programmes  in  which  a  dependent  variable  is  whether  a  household  has 
access to either IRDP or RPW (or both). We summarise the results for IRDP first. First, 
the two-party competitiveness index (           ) is negative and significant in case of 
1993 before the 73rd Constitutional Amendment took effect, but is positive in 1999 after 
the Amendment. Because more competition is associated with a smaller value of the 
index, a negative sign of the two party competition index in 1993 implies that more 
competition lead to wider household access to IRDP. After decentralization, the sign 
was reversed. The coefficient estimate of voter turnout ratio is negative and significant 
for both 1993 and 1999. Contrary to Besley and Burgess (2002), the voter turnout ratio 18 
 
does  not  reflect  the  improvement  of  the  accountability  of  governance  by  political 
participation because the general improvement of the voter turnout does not necessarily 
represent the better turnout of the poor.   
     On other coefficient estimates, land inequality is negative and significant for 1993 
and  became  statistically  non-significant  for  1999  after  decentralization.  Unequal 
distribution  of  land  may  imply  the  concentration  of  land  on  a  handful  of  large 
landowners and may have a negative impact on participation in IRDP. Illiterates were 
more  likely  to  receive  IRDP  before  and  after  decentralization.  Female-headed 
households tended to be excluded from the IRDP beneficiary selection. The landless 
were less likely to receive IRDP in 1993 and 1999. The Muslim was less likely to 
receive IRDP only in 1993. As expected, households belonging to scheduled tribe or 
scheduled caste were more likely to receive the IRDP in both years. Agricultural labour 
households were more likely to access IRDP only in 1993.         
    We have obtained a broadly similar pattern of the results for RPW and here we 
mainly focus on those specific to RPW. The two-party competitiveness index is negative 
for both 1993-1994 and 1999-2000, that is, the political competitiveness continued to 
lead to wider access to RPW before and after decentralization. However, as in the cases 
of  IRDP,  the  voter  turnout  ratio  is  negatively  associated  with  the  probability  of 19 
 
participation  in  RPW.  Land  inequality  is  positive  and  significant  only  in  1993.  A 
household with an illiterate head was more likely to be the beneficiary of RPW only in 
1993. Female headed households were less likely to be participants in RPW presumably 
because RPW would require the physically demanding tasks. As in case of IRDP, the 
landless is less likely to be a beneficiary of RPW. The Muslim dummy is not significant 
for either 1993 or 1999. SC and ST dummies have positive signs in cases of RPW. RPW 
tends  to  select  agricultural  labour  households,  but  not  agricultural  self-employment 
households.     
     The aggregate cases  in  the last two columns  of Table 2 reflect  the results  of 
individual  cases  and  thus  we  mention  only  a  few  points  below.  The  two-party 
competitiveness index has a negative and highly significant sign only for 1993 before 
decentralization. The voter turnout  ratio is negative and significant.  Land inequality 
shows a negative and significant coefficient for both 1993 and 1999. The pattern of the 
results of occupation dummies reflect the results of RPW, that is, agricultural labour 
households  were  more  likely  to  access  either  IRDP  or  RPW,  while  agricultural 
self-employment households were less likely to have any access to poverty alleviation 
programmes.     
     It is suggested by our econometric results that decentralization which took place 20 
 
only after 1993 in most of the states did not play a significant role in improving the 
selection bias against the female-headed household. In addition, the landless group also 
remained disadvantaged in participating in the poverty alleviation programs. It is also 
noted  that  political  competition  widened  the  household  access  to  IRDP  before  the 
decentralization,  but  after  decentralization  its  effect  was  reversed.  The  political 
competition  continued  to  lead  to  wider  household  access  to  RPW  before  and  after 
decentralization.   
 
IV.2. Causal Effects of Decentralization on the Allocation of Poverty Alleviation 
Programs 
The present study applies the ‘natural experiment’ method for identifying the impact of 
decentralization  on  the  allocation  of  the  poverty  alleviation  programs.  In  a  ‘natural 
experiment’, unlike the randomized experiment
17, ‘Nature’ produces the experiments, 
dividing  the  sample  into  the  control  and  treatment  groups.  ‘Nature’  includes  the 
variations in legal institutes, location, policy, natural randomness such as birth date and 
rainfall, and so on.   
     In the Indian context, it is the state governments that implement decentralization. 
The state government must enact the Panchayats act at the state level and set up new 21 
 
statutory bodies such as the State Election Commission and State Finance Commission. 
The  political  will  of  the  state  government  toward  deeper  decentralization  also 
contributes to the progress of the actual devolution of power to the Panchayats. Thus, 
we may utilize the variations in decentralization at the state level as the subject of the 
natural experiment.   
     It is noted that all states governments did not actually implement decentralization 
after  the  73rd  amendment.  For  example,  as  Upadhyay  (2002,  p.2988)  argues,  ‘The 
euphoria over a new law tends to soon give way to sombre sentiments on the limited 
impact  of  the  law  on  the  ground.  The  73rd  amendment  to  the  Constitute  of  India 
granting to constitutional status to panchayati raj institutions (henceforth PRIs) has been 
no exception. The 1992 amendment sought to make the PRIs the cornerstone of the 
process  of  local  self-governance  in  India.  However,  10  year  down  the  line,  the 
realisation in fast gaining ground that while the 73rd amendment promised much to 
panchayats, it has delivered little.’ In addition, Pal (2001, p.3449) stated, ‘Article 243 G 
of the Constitution empowered the state legislatures to give panchayats so much power 
as to make them the institutions of self-government with powers to prepare plans for 
economic  development  and  social  justice  including  the  subjects  listed  in  the  11th 
Schedule of the Constitution. But, with some exceptions in Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 22 
 
Tripura and West Bengal nothing worthwhile has been devolved to the panchayats.’ 
     As Pal (2001) argues, Madhya Pradesh is an exceptional state in implementing 
decentralization. Thus, we will employ Madhya Pradesh as the ‘treatment group’ in the 
experiment
18.  In  this  context,  ‘treatment’  refers  to  the  actual  implementation  of 
decentralization after the 73rd Constitutional Amendment. Madhya Pradesh is regarded 
as one of the most backward states and is one of the 'BIMARU' states. In fact, before 
the Amendment, there had been no serious decentralization in Madhya Pradesh. In this 
sense,  the  73rd  Constitutional  Amendment  treats  Madhya  Pradesh  and  it  is  thus 
conjectured that the data in Madhya Pradesh in 1993 were considered to be those before 
decentralization and the data in 1999 were after decentralization.       
    According  to  Behar  (1999,  p.3342),  the  chief  Minister  of  Madhya  Pradesh, 
Digvijay Singh stated, ‘decentralisation of governance is imperative in a big state like 
Madhya Pradesh, for development to take place, for people to get their rights, for the 
marginalised  and  disadvantaged  to  claim  their  space  in  society  and  for  the 
administrative  system  to  work  efficiently  and  properly.’  We  can  confirm  that  the 
political will for decentralization is clearly evident in Madhya Pradesh. In fact, Madhya 
Pradesh  was  the  first  state  to  conduct  the  Panchayat  elections  in  1994  under  the 
provision of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment. In this election, the vacancy rate of 23 
 
the members of the Panchayats was less than 1 percent, and that of the chairman of the 
Panchayats was only 0.2 percent (Institute of Social Sciences 2000, p.173). Madhya 
Pradesh  is  the  only  state  to  introduce  the  right  to  recall  the  members  of  the  Gram 
Panchayats (MaCarten and Vyasulu, 2004). Moreover, Madhya Pradesh is an advanced 
state in terms of establishing the District Planning Committee and enacting the Right to 
Information Act. 
     Table 3 shows the progress of decentralization at the state level. According to 
Table 3, Madhya Pradesh devolved power in terms of financial resource, functions, and 
staffs to the Panchayats more progressively and set up the District Planning Committee. 
It is for these reasons that we regard Madhya Pradesh as the treatment group. 
     The next question is how we identify the control groups. It is well known that the 
Karnataka, Kerala, and  West  Bengal  governments  committed to the decentralization 
before the 73rd Constitution Amendment. The decentralization implemented by these 
governments has been considered as a good practice case of decentralization in India, 
since in these states, the Panchayats have worked relatively well. The decentralization in 
the early 1980s in Karnataka, in particular, is regarded as a model case in preparing the 
73rd Constitutional Amendments. Therefore, we regard Karnataka, Kerala, and West 
Bengal  as  the  control  groups  in  the  experiments  since  these  states  implemented 24 
 
decentralization both before and after the 73rd Constitution Amendment. 
     We can summarize the framework of this natural experiment as follows: 
      treatment group        control    group 
1993    Madhya Pradesh      Karnataka, Kerala, West Bengal   
1999    Madhya Pradesh      Karnataka, Kerala, West Bengal 
 
     Our estimation strategy is to pool the sample restricted to Karnataka, Kerala, West 
Bengal, and Madhya Pradesh in both reference years and then estimate the probit model 
as follows: 
  
            
 
   
         
 
   
    
    
 
 
   
                        
 
 
   
                 
    
 
 
   
                          
             
       
            
      
where       is 1 if it is Madhya Pradesh and 0 otherwise,      is 1 if the year is 1999 and 
0  otherwise,  and        is  the  interaction  of        with      (i.e.,                 ). 
      is the key variable in our estimation to capture the impact of decentralization on 
the allocation of the poverty alleviation programs. In other words, after controlling not 25 
 
only the difference between the treatment group (Madhya Pradesh) and control group 
(Karnataka, Kerala, and West Bengal) but also the difference between before and after 
treatment  (decentralization),  the  coefficient  of  the  treatment  group  after  treatment 
(    )  yields  the  impact  of  the  treatment  (the  decentralization)  on  the  outcome(the 
allocation of poverty alleviation programs).
19  Such an estimation strategy is termed as a 
double-difference approach or a difference-in-difference approach. Furthermore,       
(as well as    and     ) and is interacted by variables of household characteristics to 
see  how  the  effect  of  decentralisation  differs  among  households  with  different 
household characteristics in before and after decentralisation in Madhya Pradesh. 
     Table 4 shows the results of the probit model discussed above. We focus on the 
political  environmental  variables        and  the  interaction  of       with  household 
characteristics. First, we discuss the case of the IRDP (see column (1)). Voter turnout 
rate  and  two-party  competitiveness  index  are  not  statistically  significant.  Land 
inequality has a negative impact on the provision of the IRDP.   
     The coefficient estimate of         is negative and significant at 10% level in case 
of  IRDP.  That  is,  contrary  to  the  expectation,  the  allocation  of  poverty  alleviation 
programmes was reduced significantly due to decentralisation in Madhya Pradesh. With 
regard  to  the  coefficient  estimate  of  the  interactions  of         with  household 
characteristics,  households  belonging  to  SCs  were  more  likely  to  receive  the 
programmes  after  decentralisation  in  Madhya  Pradesh.  However,  agricultural  labour 
households  were  less  likely  to  access  programs  after  decentralisation  in  Madhya 26 
 
Pradesh. 
     Next,  we  discuss  the  case  of  RPW.  The  voter  turnout  rate  is  positive  and 
significant- that is, the increase in political awareness led to wider access to RPW in 
these  sample  households.  The  two-party  competitiveness  index  is  not  statistically 
significant.  Land  inequality  is  negative  and  significant.  The  coefficient  estimate  of 
    
  is not significant in case of RPW. Second, with regard to the interaction of       
with household characteristics, none of the variables are statistically significant. We can 
conclude that there is little effect of the decentralization on the provision of RPW.
20 
     Finally, we consider the case of the poverty alleviation programs as a whole. 
Neither the voter turnout rate nor the two -party competitiveness index is statistically 
significant. Land inequality is negative and significant. While none of the interaction of 
      with household characteristics is statistically significant, the coefficient of       
is  positive  and  statistically  significant,  implying  that  the  allocation  of  the  poverty 
alleviation programs is significantly reduced due to decentralization in Madhya Pradesh.   
 
V.  Concluding Observations 
This paper investigates the effect of the devolution of power - induced by the 73rd 
Constitution Amendment - to the village level government. After decentralization, the 
elected Panchayats  had  the responsibility to  decide the beneficiary selection for the 27 
 
poverty  alleviation  programs.  By  using  the  National  Sample  Survey  data  and  the 
Election Commission's election data, we highlighted the household-level allocation of 
poverty  alleviation  programs  before  and  after  decentralization  as  well  as  the  causal 
effect of decentralization on the provision of the programs. 
     The  main  findings  are  summarised  below.  First,  the  regional  socio-political 
environment is likely to affect the allocation of the poverty alleviation programs, that is, 
greater inequality in land-holdings and less competition between the two major political 
parties generally lead to less provision of the poverty alleviation programs. Second, the 
disadvantaged groups were not necessarily likely to be the primary beneficiaries over 
others of the poverty alleviation programs. For example, the female-headed households 
and  the  landless  groups  remained  disadvantaged  in  participating  in  these  programs 
throughout  the  period.  However,  the  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes,  and 
agricultural labour households have were in an advantaged position in receiving the 
programs.   
     Third, it has been suggested by our ‘natural experiment’ based on the difference 
in difference approach applied to Madhya Pradesh that the provision of the poverty 
alleviation programs was reduced by decentralization. Further, decentralization resulted 
in the allocation of the IRDP in less favour of the agricultural labour households, among 28 
 
which most of the poor are found in rural India. Our results imply the possibility that the 
power and resources were captured by the local elite after decentralisation. That is, 
decentralization did not necessarily contribute to the improvement of the welfare of the 
socially disadvantaged groups. However, decentralization resulted in greater allocation 
of  the  IRDP  to  the  Scheduled  Castes,  which  reflects  to  some  extent  an  effect  of 
decentralisation on the political reservation of the Panchayats for these groups. It is 
further  suggested  that  the  provision  of  Rural  Public  Works  was  not  influenced  by 
decentralisation.  In  general,  public  works  involve  the  self-targeting  mechanism. 
Discretionary manipulation of public works by the local elite might have been difficult, 
at least in Madhya Pradesh. However, it can be concluded by our econometric results 
given the limitation of the approach (e.g. imperfect control of year-and-state specific 
unobservable  factors  not  related  to  decentralisation)  that  decentralisation  did  not 
necessarily lead to wider household access to poverty alleviation programmes and that a 
more accountable political system is required to prevent resources from being captured 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables 
  1993          1999         
Variable  NOB  Average  SD  Min  Max  NOB  Average  SD  Min  Max 
IRDP Dummy (1 if any household member participates in IRDP 
and 0 otherwise)  68923  0.05  0.21  0.00  1.00  71252  0.06  0.23  0.00  1.00 
RPW Dummy (1 if any household member participates in RPW 
and 0 otherwise)  69301  0.04  0.19  0.00  1.00  71099  0.03  0.18  0.00  1.00 
Poverty Alleviation Programs (1 if any household member 
participates in IDPM or RPW and 0 otherwise)  69301  0.09  0.28  0.00  1.00  70959  0.08  0.28  0.00  1.00 
Illiteracy Dummy (1 if the household head is illiterate and 0 
otherwise)  69219  0.48  0.50  0.00  1.00  71413  0.46  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Female headed household (1 if the household head is female and 
0 otherwise)  69225  0.09  0.29  0.00  1.00  71466  0.10  0.30  0.00  1.00 
With own land (>=0.1ha) (1 if the household head is female and 0 
otherwise)  69230  0.95  0.23  0.00  1.00  71146  0.93  0.25  0.00  1.00 
Muslim Dummy (1 if the household head is Muslim and 0 
otherwise)  69230  0.09  0.28  0.00  1.00  71392  0.11  0.31  0.00  1.00 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) Dummy (1 if the household head belongs to 
ST and 0 otherwise)  69230  0.13  0.34  0.00  1.00  71349  0.14  0.35  0.00  1.00 
Scheduled Caste (SC) Dummy (if the household head belongs to 
SC and 0 otherwise)    69230  0.18  0.38  0.00  1.00  71349  0.18  0.38  0.00  1.00 
Agricultural labour household (1 if the occupation of the head is 
classified as an agricultural labourer and 0 otherwise)  69230  0.24  0.43  0.00  1.00  71327  0.26  0.44  0.00  1.00 
Agricultural self employment household (1 if the occupation of the 
head is classified as ‘agricultural self employment’ and 0 
otherwise)    69230  0.43  0.50  0.00  1.00  71327  0.38  0.49  0.00  1.00 
Age of the head of household  69230  44.59  13.72  0.00  99.00  71461  45.27  13.91  0.00  99.00 
Number of adult members per household  69230  3.28  1.76  0.00  45.00  71466  3.37  1.83  1.00  39.00 
Gini coefficient of own land  68773  0.69  0.08  0.41  0.95  70968  0.71  0.09  0.41  0.93 
Voter turnout ratio  67952  0.57  0.12  0.22  0.85  70968  0.61  0.09  0.34  0.82 
Two party competitiveness index
*    67952  1.52  2.16  0.00  9.05  70968  0.87  1.52  0.00  15.98 
Note: * Two-party competitiveness index is defined by (2-enp)
2 where enp refers to effective number of parties. enp refers to the effective number of parties defined by 
 
    
   
 
, where n is the 
number of parties, and pi is the ith party's vote share. 
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Table 2 Results of Basic Probit Model for Household Access to IRDP or RPW   
Dependent variable  IRDP  RPW  Poverty Alleviation Programs (IRDP or RPW)    















































Variable  coefficient  t-value 
2  coefficient  t-value  coefficient  t-value  coefficient  t-value  coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value 
Two party competitiveness 
index  -0.12  (15.07)**  0.01  (1.62)  -0.05  (6.60)**  -0.03  (3.28)**  -0.09  (15.59)**  0.00  (0.37) 
Voter turnout ratio  -0.80  (4.60)**  -0.32  (1.78)†  -1.67  (8.38)**  -0.09  (0.40)  -1.22  (8.57)**  -0.30  (1.84)† 
Gini coefficient of own land    -0.46  (3.10)**  -0.15  (0.94)  1.07  (6.46)**  -0.82  (4.26)**  -0.19  (1.59)  -0.60  (4.19)** 
Illiteracy Dummy  0.03  (1.74)†  0.03  (1.71)†  0.17  (7.89)**  0.00  (0.02)  0.11  (6.90)**  0.01  (0.53) 
Female headed household    -0.25  (7.02)**  -0.05  (1.74)†  -0.13  (3.65)**  -0.16  (4.32)**  -0.20  (7.00)**  -0.09  (3.43)** 
With owned land or not    -0.40  (7.83)**  -0.10  (2.74)**  -0.13  (2.86)**  -0.05  (1.15)  -0.25  (6.88)**  -0.09  (2.84)** 
Muslim Dummy  -0.06  (1.74)†  0.00  (0.06)  0.05  (1.40)  0.01  (0.31)  -0.01  (0.37)  0.00  (0.13) 
Scheduled Tribe (ST)  0.24  (8.78)**  0.24  (9.91)**  0.10  (3.55)**  0.28  (9.88)**  0.17  (7.23)**  0.30  (14.00)** 
Scheduled Caste (SC)    0.31  (13.76)**  0.14  (6.34)**  0.10  (3.96)**  0.04  (1.61)  0.24  (12.21)**  0.12  (5.96)** 
Agricultural labour household  0.11  (4.28)**  0.01  (0.42)  0.08  (3.03)**  0.09  (3.45)**  0.09  (4.35)**  0.04  (1.84)† 
Agricultural self employment 
household  0.03  (1.52)  0.03  (1.45)  -0.20  (8.33)**  -0.22  (8.99)**  -0.09  (5.24)**  -0.08  (4.33)** 
Age of the head of household  -0.00  (1.50)  -0.00  (1.13)  -0.00  (4.60)**  -0.00  (2.62)**  -0.00  (4.49)**  -0.00  (2.10)* 
Number of adult members    0.03  (6.88)**  0.01  (1.08)  0.03  (4.57)**  0.02  (3.55)**  0.04  (9.03)**  0.01  (2.48)* 
Whether in UTs  0.44  (6.64)**  0.09  (1.42)  -0.09  (0.92)  -0.30  (3.51)**  0.46  (7.94)**  -0.03  (0.54) 
Whether in North Region    0.04  (0.80)  0.34  (7.49)**  1.03  (18.61)**  0.24  (4.29)**  0.54  (13.55)**  0.34  (8.36)** 
State Dummies 
1  Yes.    Yes.    Yes.    Yes.    Yes.    Yes.   
Constant  -1.08  (7.16)  -1.58  (10.76)  -1.91  (13.13)  -1.17  (7.20)  -0.77  (6.49)  -0.99  (7.73) 
Notes 1: State Dummies are included but not shown in the results. 2. ** = statistically significant at 1 % level. *= statistically significant at 5 % level. †=statistically significant at 10% level.     
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Table 3 Progress of the Decentralization at the State Level 
 
progress of devolution to the Panchayats under the 
Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution 
District Planning 
Committee 
State  financial resource  functions  staff    
AP  17%  45%  7%  No 
Arunachal Pradesh  0%  0%  0%  No 
Assam  0%  0%  0%  No 
Bihar  0%  0%  0%  No 
Jharkhand  0%  0%  0%  NA 
Goa  0%  0%  0%  No 
Gujarat  0%  0%  0%  No 
Haryana  0%  55%  0%  Yes 
HP  7%  79%  24%  No 
Karnataka  100%  100%  100%  Yes 
Kerala  52%  100%  52%  Yes 
MP  34%  79%  31%  Yes 
Chhattisgarh  34%  79%  31%  NA 
Maharashtra  62%  62%  62%  No 
Manipur  0%  76%  14%  Yes 
Orissa  17%  86%  10%  Yes 
Punjab  0%  24%  0%  No 
Rajasthan  0%  100%  0%  Yes 
Sikkim  100%  100%  100%  Yes 
Tami Nadu  0%  100%  0%  Yes 
Tripura  0%  41%  0%  Yes 
UP  41%  45%  31%  Yes 
Uttarakhand  41%  45%  31%  NA 
West Bengal  41%  100%  41%  Yes 
A & N Island  0%  0%  0%  Yes 
Chandigarh  0%  0%  0%  No 
D & N Haveli  0%  10%  10%  Yes 
Daman & Diu  0%  100%  0%  No 
Delhi  0%  0%  0%  No 
Lakshwdeep  0%  21%  0%  Yes 
Pondicherry  0%  0%  0%  No 
JK  NA  NA  NA  No 
Meghalaya  NA  NA  NA  No 
Mizoram  NA  NA  NA  No 
Nagaland  NA  NA  NA  No 
Source: Government of India, The Report of the Working Group on Decentralised Planning     
and Panchayati Raj Institutes for the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-07), 2001, Annexure II     






Table 4 Results of Probit Model of the difference-in-difference approach:   
Effects  of  Decentralisation  on  Household  Access  to  Poverty  Alleviation 
Programmes     
Dependent variable    IRDP  RPW   
poverty alleviation 
programs 
    NOB=29847  NOB=29846  NOB=29929 
    Wald chi2(40)=230.35  Wald chi2(39)=184.94  Wald chi2(40)=248.36 
    Prob>chi2=0  Prob>chi2=0  Prob>chi2=0 







      Pseudo R2=0.0198  Pseudo R2=0.032  Pseudo R2=0.0165 
               
variable    coefficient  t-value 
1  coefficient  t-value  coefficient  t-value 
Two party competitiveness 
index     0.00  (0.01)  0.01  (0.16)  0.01  (0.23) 
Voter turnout ratio       -0.16  (0.67)  0.94  (2.54)*  0.27  (1.21) 
Gini coefficient of own land       -1.07  (4.21)**  -0.67  (1.83)†  -0.95  (4.10)** 
Illiteracy Dummy    0.11  (2.11)*  0.21  (2.55)*  0.14  (2.99)** 
Female headed household    -0.20  (2.50)*  0.02  (0.18)  -0.17  (2.47)* 
With owned land or not    0.35  (2.92)**  0.06  (0.39)  0.19  (2.00)* 
Muslim Dummy    0.07  (0.98)  -0.13  (1.27)  0.01  (0.19) 
Scheduled Tribe (ST)    0.29  (3.22)**  -0.07  (0.44)  0.23  (2.76)** 
Scheduled Caste (SC)    0.44  (7.88)**  -0.07  (0.71)  0.34  (6.62)** 
Agricultural labour household    0.02  (0.42)  -0.05  (0.55)  0.00  (0.07) 
Agricultural self employment 
household    -0.16  (2.74)**  -0.13  (1.49)  -0.16  (3.12)** 
Age of the head of household    0.00  (0.59)  0.00  (2.94)**  0.00  (1.50) 
Number of adult members    0.03  (3.83)**  0.03  (3.45)**  0.03  (4.35)** 
D
MP    0.53  (2.81)**  0.62  (2.62)**  0.54  (3.37)** 
D
T    0.27  (1.64)†  0.51  (2.77)**  0.39  (3.05)** 
D
MPT     -0.42  (1.66)†  -0.37  (1.30)  -0.44  (2.11)* 
Illiteracy Dummy  ×D
MP  -0.15  (1.90)†  -0.06  (0.51)  -0.13  (1.74)† 
Female headed household  ×D
MP  0.07  (0.43)  -0.04  (0.19)  0.06  (0.44) 
With owned land or not  ×D
MP  -0.54  (3.17)**  -0.38  (1.84)†  -0.47  (3.28)** 
Muslim Dummy  ×D
MP  -0.25  (1.06)  -0.34  (1.27)  -0.33  (1.41) 
Scheduled Tribe (ST)  ×D
MP  -0.19  (1.70)†  0.39  (2.22)*  -0.05  (0.44) 
Scheduled Caste (SC)  ×D
MP  -0.25  (2.64)**  0.22  (1.47)  -0.13  (1.45) 
Agricultural labour household  ×D
MP  0.22  (2.11)*  0.09  (0.63)  0.21  (2.15)* 
Agricultural self employment 
household  ×D
MP  0.24  (2.34)*  -0.11  (0.77)  0.16  (1.75)† 
Illiteracy Dummy  ×D
T  -0.01  (0.19)  -0.10  (1.03)  -0.06  (0.96) 
Female headed household  ×D
T  0.11  (1.09)  -0.09  (0.65)  0.09  (0.93) 
With owned land or not  ×D
T  -0.17  (1.07)  -0.26  (1.43)  -0.19  (1.47) 
Muslim Dummy  ×D
T  -0.02  (0.17)  0.07  (0.52)  0.02  (0.26) 
Scheduled Tribe (ST)  ×D
T  -0.19  (1.51)  0.13  (0.68)  -0.19  (1.61) 
Scheduled Caste (SC)  ×D
T  -0.33  (4.12)**  0.06  (0.47) 
 
-0.30  (4.16)** 
Agricultural labour household  ×D
T  0.04  (0.56)  -0.04  (0.37)  -0.01  (0.18) 
Agricultural self employment 
household  ×D
T  0.18  (2.25)*  -0.05  (0.47)  0.06  (0.88) 
Illiteracy Dummy  ×D
MPT     0.18  (1.58)  -0.01  (0.04)  0.09  (0.91) 
Female headed household  ×D
MPT  0.00  (0.01)  0.09  (0.31)  0.01  (0.06) 
With owned land or not  ×D
MPT  0.26  (1.07)  0.34  (1.25)  0.31  (1.55) 
Muslim Dummy  ×D
MPT   0.28  (0.91)  -  -
     2  0.24  (0.83) 
Scheduled Tribe (ST)  ×D
MPT  0.26  (1.62)  -0.15  (0.65)  0.23  (1.55) 
Scheduled Caste (SC)  ×D
MPT  0.25  (1.78)†  -0.25  (1.25)  0.17  (1.38) 
Agricultural labour household  ×D
MPT  -0.32  (2.13)*  -0.01  (0.04)  -0.19  (1.41) 
Agricultural self employment 
household  ×D
MPT   -0.21  (1.46)  0.05  (0.23)  -0.14  (1.10) 
Constant     -1.36  (4.62)  -2.41  (5.93)  -1.39  (5.37) 
Notes: 1. ** = statistically significant at 1 % level. *= statistically significant at 5 % level. †=statistically significant at 10% level.     
2. When Muslim Dummy×D
MPT is inserted in estimation equation, maximum likelihood estimation can not be obtained in the   
public works case. Thus, in some equation I drop religion2×DMPT.         37 
 
Endnotes 
                                                   
1  Crook and Manor (1998, p.61) based on the detailed fieldwork in Karnataka state 
‘Decentralisation in Karnataka yielded paradoxical results. The number of people 
involved in corrupt acts increased significantly. But the overall amount of money 
stolen almost certainly decreased - at least modestly. We cannot offer absolute proof of 
this latter point, but the evidence to support it is strong.’   
2  Planning Commission, Government of India, Sixth Five Year Plan 1980-85, Seventh 
Five Year Plan 1985-90, Eighth Five Year Plan 1992-97, Ninth Five Year Plan 
1997-2002, and Tenth Five Year Plan 2002-07. 
3  NSSO, Government of India (2001). 
4  Ministry of Rural Development, Quick Evaluation Study of TRYSEM. 
5  Ministry of Rural Development, Role of Panchayati Raj Institutions in the Rural 
Development Programmes. 
6  NSSO, Government of India (2001).   
7  Planning Commission, Government of India, Tenth Five Year Plan 2002-07. 
8  National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), a variant of RPW, has 
been launched since 2005. The plan was launched in February 2006 in 200 districts 
and eventually extended to cover 593 districts. More than 4 million rural households 
were provided jobs under NREGA during 2008-09. Our results on RPW should have 
some implications for designing and implementing NREGS.   
9  These figures are calculated from the following plan documents: Planning 
Commission, Government of India, Sixth Five Year Plan 1980-85, Seventh Five Year 
Plan 1985-90, Eighth Five Year Plan 1992-97, Ninth Five Year Plan 1997-2002, Tenth 
Five Year Plan 2002-07. 
10  NSSO, Government of India (2001).   
11  Ministry of Rural Development, Concurrent Evaluation Report of JRY. 
12  Ministry of Rural Development, Role of Panchayati Raj Institutions in the Rural 
Development Programmes. 
13  The election data of Punjab is drawn from the Statistical Report on General Elections, 
1992 to the Tenth Lok Sabha. 
14  Matching at district levels is impossible because of the lack of district code in the 
50th NSS.   
15  Household consumption or poverty status based on consumption is not included not 
only because it is likely to be endogenous, but also consumption data are not 
comparable between these two rounds. 
16  Precise owned land data are not available in the consumption module of the 55th 
NSS. Hence, we constructed the regional land inequality index from the 
employment-unemployment module. 
17  See Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer (2008) for a detailed account of the randomized 
experiment.   
18  It is difficult to compare Tripura with the other states since Tripura is located in the 
North East region, which is specially treated by the central government and thus is not 
included in the treatment group.     
19  A limitation of this approach is that the unobservable factors which are specific to 
Madhya Pradesh in 1999 (not related to decentralisation) and are not captured by the 
survey data might also be captured by     . While we make an assumption here that 38 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
control variables capture most of these unobservable factors, the coefficient estimate 
of         should be still interpreted with caution.           
20  Using NSS data in 1987 and 1993, Gaiha, Imai and Kaushik (2001) showed that the 
large section of members in non-poor households participated in IRDP and RPW, with 
RPW maintaining a slight superiority in targeting performance and they suggested the 
possibility of wastage and diversion of public funds for these programmes in a context 
of corrupt bureaucracy and capture of locally elected bodies such as Panchayats by a 
few influential persons. Our results are in line with Gaiha, Imai and Kaushik’s (2001) 
findings.     